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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study was designed to research current air medical risks and identify the 
extent of the risk from 2005 – 2011 by looking at NTSB data.  Sixty-eight rotorcraft air 
medical incidents were discovered based on preset criteria, such as resulting injury or 
significant damage to aircraft, for severe air medical incidents.  Six major concerns in air 
medical safety were researched in this study: day and nighttime incidents, takeoff/landing 
and in-flight incidents, Part 91 and Part 135 regulations, pilot hours, post-crash fire, and 
changing visual conditions.  From information given in the NTSB reports based on 
incident investigation, this information was collected then analyzed for statistical 
significance.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In serious emergency incidents when seconds count, a medical helicopter that 
transports a patient to an advanced hospital can mean the difference between the life and 
death.  Unfortunately, the death of the patient may not occur due to incident for which the 
medical helicopter was dispatched for but may in fact be due to the helicopter crashing 
while transporting the patient to the hospital.  Air medical services are in the business to 
save the lives of critical patients, but unfortunately, flight crews and patients become 
victims when crashes and fatalities occur during these high-risk operations.   Even more 
concerning is that rate of crashes are skyrocketing.  According to Baker et al. (2006), the 
air medical helicopter crash rate per 100,000 flying hours was 1.7 from 1996 to 1997 and 
4.8 from 2003 and 2004.  Further, a rate of 1.8 per 100,000 flying hours was noted from 
2000 to 2004.  At a rate of 1.8, a crewmember would have a 37% chance of becoming a 
fatality flying 20 hours per week for 20 years (p. 351-352).  The risk of injury and death 
from air medical crashes seems to outweigh the risk of a patient becoming a victim due to 
inadequate medical care.  Unfortunately, Foo, Ahghari, and MacDonald (2010) state that 
“discontinuation of existing air medical transport, in one setting, resulted in a fourfold 
increase in mortality for patients transported from a rural hospital” (p. 463).  In terms of 
trauma care, a common industry practice is to utilize the “golden hour” rule in which a 
patient has a better chance of survival from the time the incident occurs to arrival at the 
emergency room in less than one hour where surgery can occur.  In a rural setting, it can 
be extremely challenging, if nearly impossible, to meet this principle even with air 
medical transportation.  Typically, a rural hospital does not have the capability to meet 
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the needs for advanced traumatic surgery, and a patient requires a higher-level of care at a 
A regional trauma center.  With both aspects of the problem in mind, research into why 
air medical crashes occur is paramount to operational as well as public safety.  Due to an 
increase in the number of crashes occurring, the National Transportation Safety Board 
(2006) published a major investigative report based on EMS fixed-wing and helicopter 
crashes between 2002 and 2005.  Further, the National Transportation Board (NTSB) 
found that some regulations were lacking when patients were not onboard, limited use of 
flight risk evaluation programs, poor dispatch procedures as well as no regulations 
mandating the use of terrain awareness systems (p. vii). 
Another aspect of air medical operations, in terms of safety, is the great deal of 
growth in air medical utilization.  According to Isakov (2006), 650-700 air medical 
helicopters are currently being utilized as opposed to roughly 300 air medical helicopters 
in the mid 1990s.  Twice as many patients are being transported via air medical 
helicopters utilizing twice the amount of flying hours (p. 357).  In terms of growth, the air 
medical industry basically doubled in just over a decade.  With such an increase in the air 
medical industry, it is crucial that safety standards as well as identifying and decreasing 
risk are researched and practiced.  If the industry expands even more, safety issues will 
become more apparent and problematic. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate crashes and fatalities that have 
resulted since 2005 when the major report was released from the NTSB.  Further, factors 
regarding the air medical incidents such weather factors, time of day, causation, and other 
factors will be included as part of a comprehensive report.  The goal is to find risk factors 
that could potentially be targeted in the future to help reduce the amount of crashes and 
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fatalities.  Data will be gathered from the NTSB and FAA databases as incidents are 
reported to these agencies.  The study retrospective study will include rotorcraft only and 
include accidents from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2011.  After discovering the 
extent of progress being made in air medical safety, recommendations as to what safety 
devices, training, or best practices could help decrease the likelihood of events from 
reoccurring. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Identifying causes of air medical crashes is crucial to developing risk factors in 
order to prevent future accidents.  Much research has been done in identifying risk factors 
as well as causes for air medical incidents.  While some risk factors, such as weather or 
time of day, have been identified, a trend over a period of years is important to research 
to see if progress is being made within that specific risk.  The NTSB (2006) found that 55 
accidents occurred between January 2002 and January 2005 with 54 fatalities resulting 
from air medical crashes (p. vii).  Bledsoe (2003) performed a similar research study and 
found that 47 accidents occurred between January 1997 and December 2001 with 40 
fatalities.  The rate of fatalities per crash is 0.85 (p. 94-96).  The rate of fatalities per 
crash in the NTSB report is 0.98, which represents a 15% increase in just three years.  
Limiting factors to this data are that a small number of crashes could influence trends by 
an increase in just a few serious crashes with multiple fatalities resulting.  Further, 
Bledsoe’s data only included helicopter aircraft instead of the NTSB data that included 
fixed-wing medical aircraft as well.  Further, investigations on differences between air 
medical fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft safety must be completed.  In a different study, 
Bledsoe (2004) found that from 1993 to 2002, 52% of the fatal crashes took place in the 
last three years of the study (p. 1325-1326).  This is a sobering fact in that air medical 
crashes are increasing dramatically.  Bledsoe (2004) also found that air medical 
helicopter incidents with fatalities have been increasing in other countries as well (p. 
1326). Comparatively, Sullivent, Faul, and Wald (2011) report that from 1991 to 2002, 
300 fatal crashes with 357 fatalities occurred in ground ambulance operations (p. 300).  
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Even with numerous fatalities, ground ambulances are typically utilized much more 
frequently than air medical operations.  Further, ground ambulances can be used in poor 
weather conditions whereas medical aircraft may remain grounded. 
 In addition to the rising number of fatalities per crash, nighttime air medical 
operations have been found to be extremely deadly and fatalities are on the rise.  The 
NTSB (2006) found that out of 55 accidents, 15 fatal accidents occurred during nighttime 
operations, which represents 27% of total accidents but 71% of total fatal accidents.  This 
study looked at rotor as well as fixed wing aircraft from January 2002 to January 2005 (p. 
vii, 26).  Bledsoe (2003) had similar findings with night operation accidents accounting 
for 47% of all accidents with 73% of all fatalities occurring at night in 11 night 
operations (p. 95-96).  Further, Baker et al. (2006) found that from January 1983 to April 
2005 that 48% of nighttime crashes resulted in 68% of fatalities.  In addition, crashes 
were found to occur evenly throughout the year, but fatal crashes were more likely to 
occur from December to February.  The number of flying hours a pilot had did not 
influence the fatal outcome of a crash (p. 352-353).  Even though nighttime crashes are 
more deadly than daytime crashes, more research needs to be performed into how many 
missions are actually being performed during nighttime to calculate a nighttime versus 
daytime crash rate.  Baker et al. (2006) states “this study of the outcome of crashes 
reveals that when a helicopter EMS crash occurs, darkness more than triples the risk of 
fatalities, and bad weather increases the risk 8-fold” (p. 353).  Weather can be difficult to 
study as conditions are constantly changing during an air medical mission; and, an 
aircraft may encounter different weather patterns during the flight.  A survey of air 
medical helicopter pilots by Dery, Hustuit, Boschert, and Wish (2007) found that 92% of 
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pilots felt that “pushing weather minimums” is the main cause to helicopter air medical 
crashes in recent years (p. 38, 41).  More research into why medical aircraft are flying 
during borderline weather conditions is needed.  Further, crashes due to weather must be 
identified in order to see if certain types of conditions are likely to result in a crash.  It is 
unclear if weather is generally a cause of crashes or mostly a risk factor contributing to 
crashes and fatalities. 
 According to the NTSB (2006), air medical services operate under two different 
sets of regulations.  14 CFR 135 (Part 135) regulations apply to air medical operations 
only when a patient is onboard the aircraft.  14 CFR 91 (Part 91) regulations apply to air 
medical operations when no patient is onboard.  Part 91 regulations are more relaxed in 
terms of minimum weather requirements and length of duty regulations.  The NTSB 
found, from January 2002 to January 2005, that 35 of the 55 crashes occurred under Part 
91 regulations with no patient onboard the aircraft.  Further, 10 of the 55 crashes were 
operating under Part 91 weather requirements and fixed wing as well as rotorcraft would 
have been grounded due to weather if Part 135 regulations were followed (p. vii, 1-2).  
The NTSB promotes stricter regulations for medical aircraft operations, but it is 
important to note a special circumstance that may arise in air medical weather decisions.  
For example, even though numerous aircraft were operating under Part 91 regulations 
when they crashed, an air medical company is not going to send an aircraft to a scene of a 
car accident, in borderline Part 91 conditions, to pick up a patient knowing that the 
aircraft is not going to be able to take off from the scene due to the requirements of Part 
135 regulations now that a patient is onboard.  In a sense, an aircraft may remain 
grounded if Part 135 weather minimums are not met due to the fact that a patient will be 
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onboard the aircraft for part of the mission.  This allows some safety, although universal 
Part 135 regulations for the entire flight would provide greater safety. 
 Research has been conducted on stressors present for helicopter crews.   
Carchietti, Valent, Cecchi, and Rammer (2011) found that heart rate increases while 
flying in an EMS helicopter.  Hypoxia due to altitude or vibrations could be a potential 
cause for increased heart rate (p. 272-273).  Working around stressful scenes and with 
severely hurt or sick patients may cause an air medical crewmember to be stressed.  
Carchietti et al. (2011) state that “the medical crewmember under stress will tend to focus 
on 1 problem while ignoring other more critical information . . . commonly known as 
‘tunnel vision’” (p. 270).  If an air medical crew is extremely concerned about getting to a 
scene to help a pediatric trauma patient, individuals may be mentally preparing for the 
scene while not thinking about safely arriving at the scene.  People might take shortcuts 
without considering the consequences in terms of safety. 
Another potential stressor is fatigue.  Frakes and Kelly (2007) report that in 20% 
of all transportation incidents, fatigue is a factor.  Pilot fatigue and the number of flight 
hours has not been found to affect helicopter medical crashes; but, human error has been 
found to be a major factor in air medical crashes that could result from fatigue (p. 46).  
Similarly, Bledsoe (2003) found that 70% percent of accidents involved pilot error (p. 
97).  If pilot error is common with the number of flight hours as a nonfactor, potentially 
other stressors or factors, coupled with night operations, are contributing to air medical 
crashes.  A study on emergency physicians working during the night found decreased 
reaction times and a higher likelihood of skipping steps in a procedure with worsening 
performance as the night progressed (p. 46).  This finiding could apply to a pilot or EMS 
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crewmember in the same way as a physician. Caldwell (2001) states, “improperly 
managed operator fatigue can become a significant problem in environments that require 
alertness, complex judgment, and quick reactions, such as air EMS” (p. 25).  Even though 
pilot fatigue has not been found to be a direct cause of EMS crashes, fatigue could be a 
contributing factor in making decisions when performing air medical operations.  
Complacency in performing a preflight checklist as part of job duties could be a 
safety hazard in air medical operations.  Frakes and Van Voorhis (2007) report that the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration found that when humans complete a 
checklist, people will rely on one’s own memory, not crosschecking work when one 
person is reciting, combine items on the list, not finishing the checklist, or be distracted 
while completing the task (p. 248).  Unfortunately, every industry is plagued by 
employee complacency; but, some industries have more at stake than others.  High-risk 
industries, such as air medical, have little room for error.  Research into sleeping patterns 
of pilots as well as crewmembers involved in crashes needs to be assessed to gain a better 
understanding of fatigue prior to an incident.  Frakes and Kelly (2007) also found that 
81.1% of all participants in an EMS helicopter crewmember sleep study held 
employment elsewhere (46-47).  This information is crucial to understanding fatigue.  A 
paramedic from an EMS ground service that worked a 24-hour shift prior to arriving at 
work for a 24-hour flight shift may have not had adequate rest to perform effectively or 
safely.  Further regulations for crew rest minimums prior to arrival at work may need to 
established and researched. 
 Safety equipment for EMS helicopters could potentially help reduce the number 
of crashes and fatalities.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (2010) advised that 
 9"
night vision goggles potentially allow for safer operations.  The FAA states that one set 
of night vision goggles cost approximately $7,000 and numerous sets are needed for an 
aircraft.  The FAA also states that some air medical operators have never had a crash at 
night without utilizing this safety equipment (p. 4).  More research needs to be performed 
in this area to see the incidence of night crashes and the extent of whether or not night 
vision goggles are being utilized. If the devices are somewhat useful, but very expensive, 
then a cost analysis will need to be performed.  According to Dery et al. (2007), a survey 
of EMS helicopter pilots revealed that night vision goggles were the top safety device 
needed to improve safety, and that 74% of pilots wanted their implementation (p. 38, 41).  
If pilots want the devices and feel that operations will become safer, research into why 
the devices are not being implement must take place.  In the major crash report produced 
by the NTSB, the NTSB (2006) gives some further considerations for the use of night 
vision goggles.  Night vision goggles cannot be utilized in urbanized areas due to ambient 
light.  However, it was found that the use of night vision goggles would have likely 
prevented 13 of the 55 crashes researched in the report.  The 13 accidents all involved the 
need to observe obstacles (p. 12-13).  While some downsides are present, such as use in 
urban areas, night visions goggles could potentially be utilized as a tool for night 
operations when viewing obstacles is important.  In mountainous or hilly terrain, viewing 
obstacles is crucial to safe operations, and night vision goggles could help in these 
situations.  While it is easy to retrospectively criticize EMS companies or pilots for not 
having or utilizing safety equipment, research needs to be performed in the effectiveness 
of these devices as well as performing trials and collecting feedback from crews onboard 
the aircraft before universal implementation. 
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The FAA (2010) also recommends the use of terrain awareness systems.  
However, modifications need to be made for VFR aircraft at lower altitudes, as VFR 
aircraft usually fly at lower altitudes, due to the possibility of false readings (p. 5).  The 
NTSB (2006) found in their comprehensive report that 17 of the 55 crashes could have 
resulted differently if terrain awareness systems had been installed.  The NTSB also 
recommends that the FAA mandate the use of terrain awareness systems (p. 11-12).  
Studies must be conducted in terrain awareness systems in terms of feasibility and 
modification for air medical use.  Potentially, an entirely different type of hazard 
awareness system may need to be created specifically for air medical aircraft. 
 Aircraft have several safety features that may help protect occupants.  Tomazin, 
Ellerton, Reisten, Sotera, and Avbeli (2011) recommend that aircraft be outfitted with 
energy-absorbing seats as well as crash-resistant fuel systems (p. 337).  According to 
Baker et al. (2006), a study about EMS crashes over more than a 20-year period found 
that 19% of EMS crashes resulted in a post-crash fire with 76% of the post-fire crashes 
resulting in fatalities.  If no post-crash fire was present, 29% of crashes resulted in 
fatalities (p. 352-353).  Clearly, post-crash fire may be a major factor into determining 
the survivability of a crash.  More research needs to be performed to determine post-crash 
fire rate during nighttime operations to see if these risk factors are interrelated for 
fatalities.  In addition, research into fire-resistant aircraft versus nonfire-resistant air 
medical aircraft that have crashed must be performed in order to determine occupant 
outcomes.  Dodd (1994) reports that a study of U.S. Army helicopters revealed that 37% 
of fatalities resulted from post-crash fire in survivable crashes with helicopters that did 
not have a crashworthy fuel system while no fatalities were noted in survivable crashes 
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with post-crash fire in helicopters that had a crashworthy fuel system (p. 284).  Fire 
resistant safety features of an air medical aircraft could potentially save lives similar to 
what occurred to U.S. Army helicopters. Hawkins (1994), in a study completed by the 
U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, found that in just 20 seconds after a post-
crash fire, heat levels can reach 2000 degrees Fahrenheit.  Most nonfire-resistant clothing 
will ignite in seconds, which can cause burns.  This causes morbidity and mortality to 
increase by fourfold (p. 125).  This research shows that fire-resistant clothing is crucial 
for EMS air medical crews to wear.  Further, it shows that post-fire crashes can become 
extremely hot, which likely has an impact on survival.  More research into how many 
EMS operators are utilizing protective clothing must be completed. 
As landing and takeoff are critical parts of an air medical mission, it is important 
to understand safety techniques for takeoff and landing.  On a scene flight, such as at a 
car accident, any form of light should be refrained from being shined into an aircraft 
(Tremayne, 2009, p. 12).  This could interfere with the pilot from being able to see 
objects or hazards.  Another safety feature that should be discussed is preset landing 
zones.  Foo, Ahghari, and MacDonald (2010) state that “building and designating secure 
landing sites such as helipads are a potential solution to mitigate this risk [darkness, bad 
weather, and post crash fires] while maintaining HEMS access” (p. 461).  Preset landing 
zones have the potential to provide a safe alternative to scene flights.  These zones do not 
necessarily need to be paved, but just be a flat area.  An ambulance service could easily 
designate several areas of flat land every few miles utilize as a landing zone if needed.  
This would aid in the familiarity for pilots landing during nighttime operations as well as 
provide known safe clearance.  In addition, dispatch procedures would be streamlined.  
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More research needs to be performed in areas that have preset landing zones versus areas 
that do not with the resulting crash rates in those locations.  Further, Robinson and 
Johnson (2009) state that local wind conditions can change due to buildings, such as 
hospitals, or other obstructions that can lead to safety hazards (p. 232).  An air medical 
company could easily identify common wind hazards through preset landing zones.  If 
known wind hazards are present, landing zones can be moved prior to an emergency 
occurs in which air medical resources are needed or training for pilots can occur if the 
wind hazard cannot be mitigated.  While preset landing zones may decrease risk, harm to 
a patient may occur as well.  Foo et al. found that for every 10 km a patient must travel, a 
1% increase in absolute mortality resulted (p. 463).  This information presents a problem 
that must be researched through risk assessment.  If a ground ambulance must drive a 
patient several miles just to get to a landing zone, it could potentially harm the patient.  
But, a helicopter that enters a high-risk and unplanned landing zone could potentially 
crash, and therefore hurt the patient even more.  This would need to be further researched 
and assessed by local terrain and obstruction agencies in a specific area. 
 As numerous risks have been identified, one could seemingly see how difficult it 
would be for an air medical service to mitigate the numerous risks, especially if they all 
occur at once.  Thomas, Groke, and Handrahan (2011) suggest the use of preflight risk 
assessment scores to help identify numerous risks present in air medical operations.  
Risks such as “pilot experience, weather, night versus daytime operations, local versus 
nonlocal flights, familiar versus unfamiliar terrain, fatigue factors, and knowledge of a 
prior pilot turndown for same transport” (p. 49).  These quick checklists allow for an 
expedited analysis of the situation for safety hazards.  Thomas et al. (2011) further 
 13"
explains that scores are assigned based on hazards, which are generally created by the air 
medical operator.  No standard values or checklists exist, but the higher the score, the 
greater the risk.  At some services, higher scores require approval from someone outside 
the responding crew (p. 49).  While these checklists seem a positive safety 
implementation, the effectiveness must be studied.  It would be important to discover the 
perception of risk prior to an air medical crash by a crew as well as by an outside party.  
“Tunnel vision” could be a factor in assessment of risk for an air medical mission.  The 
NTSB (2006) found that a flight risk program may have altered the outcome in some of 
the air medical crashes researched (p. 4-5).  According to Thomas et al. (2011), a survey 
by the National EMS Pilots Association found that 90% of pilots complete a preflight 
assessment, but 37% found that the risk assessment was not effective in marginal weather 
conditions (p. 49).  If pilots do not find a document to be effective, then research into 
why the document is ineffective as well as solutions to produce a more effective 
document must be found.  Trust in safety practices for air medical operations are crucial.  
Understanding risks of air medical operations as well as understanding that numerous 
risks coupled together causes crashes with resulting fatalities.  Checklists may be able to 
help identify numerous risks quickly that people mentally cannot assess together at the 
same time.  Thomas et al. (2011) state that “one of the most cost-effective means of 
reducing accidents may not be the ready acceptance and implementation of expensive 
technology or training but rather the acceptance and implementation of reliable and 
validated risk assessment scores” (p. 53).  More studies in the accuracy of that statement 
need to take place, but sometimes, small measures can make a huge difference in terms of 
a safety culture.  Development needs to take place of a universal preflight risk 
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assessment.  Further, deviation from that checklist needs explanations.  While one 
checklist may not fit every operation, it should, generally speaking, give a general idea of 
the level of risk for most situations.  It would be important for researchers to assess risks 
present prior to crashes that have already occurred and develop a risk analysis to help 
mitigate future incidents. 
 Air medical safety and crash research is complex and data can sometimes be 
challenging to obtain.  If obtainable, most research is only on a single topic, and 
performed only once.  The air medical industry is still developing and is being utilized in 
different forms throughout different areas of the country.  Further, different areas of the 
country have different uses and hazards for the air medical industry.  Air medical crashes 
with resulting fatalities and nonfatalities must be reduced in order to provide safe 
transport of EMS crews and the critical patients they serve. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Understanding risks and how risks are increased or decreased over time is crucial 
to conducting safe air medical operations.  Research into government investigative 
reports provides relatively unbiased information.  This investigative data has been 
thoroughly researched in regard to air medical incidents.  As numerous incidents are 
researched, compiled data will begin to show certain features of high risks that lead to 
incidents as opposed to other features of low risk.  Low risks must be analyzed to make 
sure that low risks do not become high risks.  High risks must be lessened through 
mitigation strategies, risk management, and awareness.  The goal with high risks is to 
make them low risks or even no risk.  While several risks have been noted, it is important 
to note that these risks may have changed over the past few years.  This study will 
hopefully find those risks that have become more or less likely to occur.  Some risks may 
have remained the same as time has progressed.  The critical point is that unidentified 
risks could potentially cause harm to patients, flight crews, and innocent bystanders.  In 
terms of analysis, risks that are found to have increased risk for fatalities should be 
identified.  This data will be analyzed according to the following research questions: 
- Is there a statistical significance between day and night incidents and whether 
or not a fatality occurred? 
- Do Part 91 or Part 135 regulations have a statistically higher number of fatal 
crashes? 
- Do certain operations, such as takeoff/landing or en route, have a significant 
relationship to fatalities? 
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- Do post-crash fires result in a higher likelihood of fatalities? 
- Is there a statistical significance between pilot hours and fatal incidents? 
- Does an aircraft have significantly more fatal outcomes flying from VFR to 
IFR conditions than an aircraft simply flying into its originally set conditions 
(VFR or IFR)? 
If numerous risks contribute to fatalities, then several approaches might need to 
be implemented in order to decreased fatal outcomes.  Risks that are identified to 
contribute to or cause incidents can then be implemented into an air medical safety 
program to allow for safer operations.  Followed by safety program adjustments and 
implementation, research is then performed in order to understand the extent of 
effectiveness of the safety programs and risk management activities.  The degree of the 
risk might change every time research is performed as technology, legislation, and 
practices change within the air medical industry.  This creates a continuous process to try 
and eliminate air medical incidents through risk identification and mitigation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 This retrospective cross-sectional descriptive study will analyze quantitative data 
from past air medical incidents. Due to the fact that this study utilizes retrospective 
reports and no human subjects are utilized, this study is IRB exempt. The research will 
consider incidents that occurred from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2011. 
 Initial research will include identification of air medical incidents.  This will be 
identified by utilizing a NTSB database.  The NTSB Aviation Accident Database & 
Synopses allows an individual to view accident reports. The NTSB Aviation Accident 
Database & Synopses will be utilized to research helicopter crashes and events.  The 
database includes factual information, probable causes, and preliminary reports.  As 
much of this data will be included as possible, but only if tentative information is 
included, will it be noted in the results.  Key words such as “air medical”, “HEMS”, 
“flight paramedic”, and “flight nurse” will be entered into the NTSB Aviation Accident 
Database & Synopses to discover air medical incidents that resulted in victims or damage 
to an aircraft.  Events in which at least one injury or fatality occurs will be criteria for 
inclusion in the study.  An accident will be included in the study if an injury or fatality 
occurs to an occupant within the aircraft or if the aircraft is substantially damaged or 
destroyed.  To determine whether or not an aircraft is substantially damaged or destroyed, 
the aircraft damage level will be recorded as it is reported within the NTSB accident 
report.  Injury data is obtained from NTSB accident reports as well.  Aircraft must be 
operating under Part 91 or Part 135 regulations to be included.  This study will only 
include rotorcraft.  This is due to the fact that a rotorcraft can land on a highway or field 
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for an air medical incident.  A fixed-wing aircraft can only land at an airport, which 
becomes difficult to include within this type of research.  Both instrument flight rules 
(IFR) as well as visual flight rules (VFR) will be included in the research study.  Training 
as well as maintenance flights will be included.  Government aircraft will not be 
included.  People that are injured on the ground will not be included within the study.  
The injuries must occur to people on the aircraft.   
 From these databases, information will be recorded in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet.  The variables that will be assessed are under the following headings are: 
General Information, Occupant Outcomes, NTSB Report Information, Aircraft/Pilot, 
Weather, and Other Information.  General Information includes data such as time and 
date.  Night versus daytime accidents are recorded on the NTSB accident report.  If no 
day/night designation is given, night will be considered 1900 to 0700.  If dusk is reported 
as a light condition, then it will be reported as night.  Occupant Outcomes assess how 
many people were injured and what severity of injury. The NTSB Report Information 
section includes information such as regulations the aircraft was operating under at the 
time of the incident and whether or not a post-crash fire was present.  Investigation into 
what task, such as takeoff or landing, the aircraft was performing at the time of the 
incident is the main goal of data collection in this section.  Within the Aircraft/Pilot 
section, data relating to the type of aircraft as well as the number of pilot hours will be 
documented.  The Weather section strives to get a glimpse as to what types of weather 
was occurring during the incident.  Only basic weather information will be gathered in 
this section.  The Other Information section will be utilized to give a brief synopsis of the 
incident for further reference if needed. 
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 Several limitations exist in the study. Due to the nature of ongoing investigations, 
some data, even from several years ago, is still not finalized.  Data, from 2011 for 
instance, may not be fully accurate due to ongoing investigations and all reports may not 
be finalized and could even be modified as investigations continue. This data will still be 
utilized and absorbed as a risk within the results of the research.  Further, data that has 
been recorded could potentially be inaccurate.  The research relies on reports that are 
created by one agency, the NTSB, with individuals conducting investigations.  It is 
possible that investigators are biased towards certain findings, such a pilot error.  While it 
is plausible that investigators try to remain as unbiased as possible, the possibility still 
exists that the information as documented in investigations is inaccurate or biased.  One 
investigator may view potential causes of an incident differently than another.  Further, 
data may be entered into a report incorrectly.  This will be accepted as potential flaws in 
data collected due to the fact that the research cannot control for this type of bias.  In 
addition, not all reports may be filled out completely.  This data will be represented with 
a “N/A” within the data spreadsheet.  If certain data collections have a great deal of 
missing data, statistical analysis will not be performed.  Due to the competitive air 
medical industry, bias will be minimized by not providing or recording the air medical 
provider or company.  The goal of this research is not to determine which air medical 
company provides the best or safest services.  Finding which company has more serious 
incidents only strives to improve those entities.  This research looks to improve within 
the air medical industry as a whole. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS 
 After data is recorded within the Mircosoft Excel 2008 (2007) spreadsheet, this 
data will be analyzed by importing specific data into IBM SPSS Statistics version 21 
(2012) where statistical significance will be tested.  Some data will be analyzed in 
Microsoft Excel as well. Means, standard deviations, frequencies, and percentages were 
reported as appropriate.  Bivariate analyses include Chi-square tests for association, 
independent sample t-tests, and Mann-Whitney U tests.  A significance level of alpha=.05 
was used throughout. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
 Of the 68 reported incidents, 28 (41%) incidents resulted in at least one fatality.  
Five reports had only preliminary information (7%).  For incidents reporting fatalities, the 
median number of fatalities was 3 (min = 1, max = 4).  In all incidents, the median 
number of fatalities was 0 (min = 0, max = 4).  Seventy two percent of all fatal crashes 
involved 3 fatalities or more.  In terms of comparing medians among fatal incidents, 
thirty six percent of fatalities occurred during the day while 64% occurred at night.  Even 
though more fatalities occurred during the night, there was no statistical significant 
difference between time of day and median number of fatalities (median night fatalities = 
3, median day fatalities = 3, p = 0.5). 
 Sixty-four percent of fatalities were operating under Part 91 regulations, while 
only 36% were operating under Part 135 regulations.  If the number of fatalities (min = 1, 
max = 4, median Part 91 fatalities = 3, median Part 135, fatalities = 3.5) are measured 
against Part 91 and Part 135 regulations, Part 91 regulations were more likely to result in 
a fatality (p = 0.04).  Sixty eight percent of all nonfatal incidents occurred under Part 91 
regulation while 33% occurred under Part 135 regulations.  No significance was noted (p 
= 1.0) between nonfatal Part 91 and Part 135 incidents. 
 In terms of flight operations, takeoff/landing resulted in 9 incidents (33%) in 
which at least one fatality occurred.  Nineteen incidents (68%) resulted in a fatal incident 
in which the helicopter was en route.  No significance in number of fatalities was noted 
between incidents of taking off/landing versus number of fatalities (median 
takeoff/landing fatalities = 3, median en route fatalities = 3, p = 0.1).  In terms of all 68 
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nonfatal and fatal incidents, takeoff/landing had 63% of all incidents while en route had 
37% of all incidents. 
 In terms of post-crash fire with fatalities, 15 incidents (54%) had a post-crash fire.  
In terms of number of fatalities (min = 1, max = 4) and post crash fire, no significance 
(median fatalities in no post-crash fire = 3, median fatalities in post-crash fire = 3, p = 
0.9) was noted.  A total of 3 incidents resulted in post-crash fire in which there were no 
fatalities. 
 The mean number of pilot hours (only rotorcraft) for all recorded (n = 52) 
incidents was 6078 hours (SD = 3830.096).  The mean rotorcraft pilot hours for 20 fatal 
incidents was 6018 hours (SD = 4613.717) whereas the mean for 32 nonfatal incidents 
was 6115 hours (3329.217).  In terms of fatal or nonfatal incidents, no significance was 
noted between these variables (p = 0.935). 
 In terms of visual and instrument flight conditions, 17 fatal (min = 1, max = 4), 
incidents involved similar conditions whereas 7 events resulted in changing conditions.  
No significance was noted in terms of the number of fatalities and changing or constant 
conditions (median VFR to IFR fatalities = 3, median constant conditions = 3, p = 0.601). 
Table 1 includes information about specific categories and their resulting numbers 
and percentages while Table 2 includes information about which incidents were included 
and number of fatalities.1 
 
 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 See Appendix A for Table 1 and Appendix B for Table 2 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
 From the results of this study, several risks were apparent in terms of statistical 
significance.  One of the major risks noted in the findings of this research was the fact 
that Part 91 regulations are statistically more likely to result in more fatalities as opposed 
to Part 135 regulations.  Part 91 regulations are more lenient than Part 135 regulations in 
that Part 91 regulations are conducted without a patient on board the aircraft. Further, this 
study found that the median number of fatalities was 3.  This is important in that most air 
medical operators have three crewmembers, one pilot and two medical personnel, on 
board the aircraft.  With this crew arrangement, the aircraft can fly under Part 91 
regulations.  Further, the median shows that air medical crews are being killed as opposed 
to a patient being on board the aircraft in addition to the crew.  Positioning the aircraft to 
pick up a patient or after a patient is dropped off at the hospital are typically when Part 91 
regulations are being utilized.  As reported in the literature review, the NTSB (2006) had 
similar findings in incidents with Part 91 regulations resulting in more crashes.  In terms 
of risk assessment and incident prevention, an air medical flight that follows Part 135 
regulations could potentially be safer. More research into Part 135 and Part 91 regulations 
must take place before a major decision such as changing to air medical aircraft only 
flying in Part 135 regulations is put into place. 
 Interestingly, no significance was noted between day and nighttime incidents with 
the number of fatalities.  Even with no statistical significance, more fatal incidents, by 
percentage, occurred during night.  Lots of risk management programs have targeted 
nighttime flights in order to make air medical operations in low light conditions safer.  
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The use of night vision goggles is a great benefit and tool for air medical services.  Night 
vision goggles provide some risk mitigation.  Even with some risk mitigation, night 
vision goggles are extremely expensive and several incidents within this study resulted in 
misuse of night vision goggles.  Training is critical to making sure that new safety 
implementations are appropriately utilized.  While this research was not conducted to 
directly assess the use of night vision goggles, it is worth reporting for potential studies in 
the future. 
 In terms of the number of pilot hours and incident outcome, no significance was 
found.  This finding is similar to what Frakes and Kelly (2007) found as well.  Further, 
air medical pilot experience is very high as well.  This is important for air medical 
services to realize.  With the extreme growth (Isakov, 2006), air medical companies must 
not sacrifice pilot experience in terms of hiring pilots.   
  Post-crash fire produces some intriguing findings.  Baker et al. (2006) found that 
post-crash fire produced more fatal outcomes.  Within this study, it was found that about 
half of all fatal incidents resulted in post-crash fire.  Baker et al. (2006) found a much 
higher rate of fatalities in post-crash fire.  It is possible that post-crash fires in fatal 
incidents are being reduced through safety systems on aircraft or personal protective 
equipment for flight crews.  It is also possible that fatal impacts are more likely to be the 
cause of death instead of post-crash fires.  More research in this area must be performed 
prior to making any changes. 
 An interesting finding is the operation of the aircraft at the time of the incident.  
Over two thirds of all fatal air medical aircraft incidents resulted while the aircraft was en 
route from location to location.  Typically, takeoff and landing is regarded to be the more 
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critical time where an incident may occur.  Installation of terrain awareness systems as 
well as continued use of night vision goggles could potentially mitigate this risk.  In 
terms of all incidents, fatal and nonfatal, it was significantly more likely for an incident to 
occur while the aircraft was taking off or landing. Further risk mitigation must take place 
while the aircraft is en route to a destination in order to prevent fatalities. 
 In terms of weather, 25% of all fatal incidents involved changing conditions (VFR 
to IFR).  While this was not statistically significant, it is important to realize that IFR 
instruments may provide some safety and therefore risk mitigation.  One downside to 
installing IFR instrumentation on air medical aircrafts is that it can be extremely 
expensive.  Further, pilots must be trained in IFR instrumentation.  This can be costly as 
well.  A risk analysis must be performed by the air medical service prior to investing in 
IFR capabilities.  The investment in IFR pilot training and IFR aircraft is that the aircraft 
would be better able to divert safely from unexpected IFR conditions.  Again, cost 
analysis is key to IFR capabilities as different areas in the United States have differing 
weather conditions. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 This study found that some air medical risks appear to be decreasing while others 
remain unchanged.  In terms of further risk mitigation, it is important to perform a cost 
analysis in order to determine what safety programs and equipment should be acquired in 
order to provide the greatest safety for the lowest cost.  Unfortunately, the air medical 
industry has high capital expenditures and is extremely competitive.  Safety of patients, 
crewmembers, and bystanders should take priority over financial gains.  Further, 
continued research into risks for air medical incidents should be further discussed.  As 
risks change over time, a risk could easily be disregarded or not known without further 
research and therefore a strategy to prevent a tragedy go untouched.  Risk assessment 
within the air medical industry is vital to save lives and provide the best possible care to 
patients that need it the most. 
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APPENDIX A 
Number and Percentage of Fatal/Nonfatal Incidents in Categories Tested 
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Table 1 
Number and Percentage of Fatal/Nonfatal Incidents in Categories Tested 
 
Category Number (n=68) Percent 
Nonfatal 40 58.8 
Fatal 28 41.2 
          1 Fatality 5 7.4 
          2 Fatalities 3 4.4 
          3 Fatalities 15 22.1 
          4 Fatalities 5 7.4 
Day 27 39.7 
          Nonfatal 17 42.5 
          Fatal 10 35.7 
Night 41 60.3 
          Nonfatal 23 57.5 
          Fatal 18 64.3 
Part 91 45 66.2 
          Nonfatal 27 67.5 
          Fatal 18 64.3 
Part 135 23 33.8 
          Nonfatal 13 32.5 
          Fatal 10 35.7 
Post-crash Fire   
          Fatal (Yes) 15 53.6 
          Fatal (No) 13 46.4 
          Nonfatal (Yes) 3 7.5 
          Nonfatal (No) 36 90.0 
Takeoff/Landing 43 63.2 
          Nonfatal 34 85.0 
          Fatal 9 32.1 
En Route 25 36.8 
          Nonfatal 6 15.0 
          Fatal 19 67.9 
VFR to IFR 8 11.8 
          Nonfatal 1 2.5 
          Fatal 7 25.0 
Constant FR 48 70.6 
          Nonfatal 31 77.5 
          Fatal 17 60.7 
Pilot Hours  Mean 
          Fatal 20 6018.35 
          Nonfatal 32 6115.38 
 
Note:  This table represents each individual category tested within the study followed by 
the percentage and number.  Pilot hours are described as a mean and is noted above. 
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APPENDIX B 
Location and Date of Incidents Studied with Resulting Fatalities 
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Table 2 
Location and Date of Incidents Studied with Resulting Fatalities 
 
 
 
Note: This table represents the incidents included in the study with resulting fatalities. 
 
Location Date Fatalities 
Casa Grande, AZ 3-Jan-05 0 
Falkner, MS 5-Jan-05 1 
Oxon Hill, MD 10-Jan-05 2 
Pilar, NM 29-Jan-05 0 
Gentry, AR 21-Feb-05 1 
Mancos, CO 30-Jun-05 3 
West Plains, MO 13-Jul-05 0 
Valparaiso, IN 14-Jul-05 0 
Jacksonville, FL 14-Aug-05 0 
Edmonds, WA 29-Sep-05 3 
Smethport, PA 7-Oct-05 1 
Olympia, WA 28-Oct-05 0 
Robbinsdale, MN 8-Nov-05 0 
Kalispell, MT 2-Jan-06 0 
Ponce, PR 12-Jan-06 0 
Port Isabel, TX 26-Jan-06 0 
Chesterfield, IN 2-Feb-06 0 
Green Bay, WI 13-Apr-06 1 
Bonifay, FL 21-Apr-06 0 
Washington, DC 30-May-06 1 
Ponce de Leon, FL 22-Jun-06 0 
Casa Grande, AZ 27-Aug-06 0 
Brownwood, TX 26-Nov-06 0 
Hesperia, CA 10-Dec-06 3 
Isla de Vieques, PR 27-May-07 0 
Marks, MS 28-Jul-07 0 
Ridgeville, SC 9-Aug-07 0 
Mullinville, KS 22-Aug-07 0 
Talladega, AL 1-Dec-07 0 
Whittier, AK 3-Dec-07 4 
Cherokee, AL 30-Dec-07 3 
DeLand, FL 7-Jan-08 0 
S. Padre Island, TX 5-Feb-08 3 
La Crosse, WI 10-May-08 3 
Grand Rapids, MI 29-May-08 0 
Pottsville, PA 30-May-08 0 
Huntsville, TX 8-Jun-08 4 
Ash Fork, AZ 27-Jun-08 0 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
"
Note: This table represents the incidents included in the study with resulting fatalities.""
Location Date Fatalities 
Flagstaff, AZ 29-Jun-08 3 
Flagstaff, AZ 29-Jun-08 4 
Greensburg, IN 31-Aug-08 3 
Aurora, IL 15-Oct-08 4 
Cave Creek, AZ 22-Feb-09 0 
Gainsville, FL 5-Mar-09 0 
Loris, SC 2-Jul-09 0 
North Captiva Island, FL 17-Aug-09 0 
Tucson, AZ 24-Sep-09 0 
Georgetown, SC 25-Sep-09 3 
Blythe, CA 22-Oct-09 0 
Doyle, CA 14-Nov-09 3 
Decatur, TX 25-Dec-09 0 
Reno, NV 17-Jan-10 0 
El Paso, TX 5-Feb-10 3 
Brownsville, TN 25-Mar-10 3 
Santa Maria, CA 9-Apr-10 0 
Midlothian, TX 2-Jun-10 2 
Kingfisher, OK 22-Jul-10 2 
Tucson, AZ 28-Jul-10 3 
Walnut Grove, AR 31-Aug-10 3 
Riverdale, UT 22-Nov-10 0 
La Monte, MO 19-Dec-10 0 
Cherry Point, NC 29-Dec-10 0 
Albert Lea, MN 1-Jan-11 0 
Camden, SC 3-May-11 0 
Troutdale, OR 27-Jul-11 0 
Mosby, MO 26-Aug-11 4 
Carbondale, IL 13-Nov-11 0 
Green Cove Springs, FL 26-Dec-11 3 
